Despite repeated assertions by the interim government that it seeks to decentralise authority, the Energy and Mineral Resources Division appears to be moving in the opposite direction—tightening its grip and stripping distribution companies of autonomy.
Industry insiders claim that a series of letters issued by the Energy Division reveal a clear pattern of power consolidation.
New directives have effectively reduced the powers of gas distribution companies to near-zero, leaving them as little more than rubber stamps.
In its latest directive, issued on 21 April, the ministry stated that prior approval must now be obtained for granting new gas connections in the industrial and captive categories.
Referring to a meeting held on 16 April, the ministry issued specific instructions that such connections may be granted only on a case-by-case basis and solely with prior authorisation from the division.
Petrobangla has been instructed to notify all gas marketing and distribution companies accordingly.
An earlier letter, dated 16 April, signed by Deputy Secretary Rubayet Khan, outlined five new directives. It instructed that applications for gas connections be categorised into new connections, load expansions, and commitments.
The gas distribution companies were told to prepare a prioritised list, based on gas availability, and submit it to the division and Petrobangla. Moreover, it was mandated that all new connections must guarantee actual gas supply to consumers.
Revenue generation was identified as the primary objective for new connections, necessitating an economic impact assessment of each proposal. Industrial connections would be prioritised in designated zones and for export-oriented industries.
Any additional gas allocations required due to new connections or load expansions would have to be calculated, and timely LNG imports ensured.
While the first letter left some ambiguity, the second made it unmistakably clear that prior ministerial approval is required.
This shift has sparked criticism, with many questioning the role of the distribution companies’ boards, some of which include secretaries and senior officials from the Chief Adviser's Office.
Are these boards now merely to endorse prescriptions handed down from the ministry?
One directive—ordering that LNG imports be ramped up to meet anticipated increases in gas demand—was met with incredulity.
As it stands, Bangladesh cannot import more than 1,100 million cubic feet per day (mmcfd) of gas without commissioning new FSRUs or land-based LNG terminals—projects that would require two to five years to complete.
Current imports hover between 1,000 to 1,050 mmcfd.
The notion that Petrobangla can instantly respond to increased demand overlooks harsh realities.
Even using Petrobangla’s own estimates, approved consumer demand sits at 5,500 mmcfd, while actual supply is a mere 2,700 mmcfd—leaving a deficit of 2,800 mmcfd.
Even under a more conservative estimate of 4,000 mmcfd demand, the shortfall is still a troubling 1,300 mmcfd.
At full LNG capacity, supply could only be increased by about 50 mmcfd.
When asked about the first directive, Petrobangla Chairman Rezanur Rahman insisted that no power was being curtailed.
“Neither Petrobangla nor the ministry will approve connections or load expansions,” he said.
“This will remain the domain of company boards. Our goal is to ensure reliable gas delivery and monitor demand increases so we can plan LNG imports accordingly.”
However, sources within the distribution companies suggest the real drivers of these directives are mid-level bureaucrats engaged in relentless lobbying.
In some instances, managing directors initially showed initiative but later used board decisions as a shield to avoid pressure.
Frustrated lobbyists reportedly threatened to “deal with” uncooperative boards—a hint that behind-the-scenes influence may have shaped the new directives.
During the previous Awami League government, similar centralised control persisted. The ministry operated a shadow regime via an advisory committee that effectively ran a gas connection business, rendering MDs of distribution companies powerless.
Even minor equipment upgrades required consumers to lobby the ministry—often causing warranty periods on new machines to expire before they could be used.
After the change in government, some authority was returned to distribution boards, particularly in the case of Titas.
But the ministry now seems to be regaining lost ground, prompting observers to liken this to the practices of a fascist regime.
“What reform are we talking about, then?” one industry insider asked. “This is nothing short of monopolisation.”
The trend extends to regulatory delays as well. The same rules that the previous government used to set fuel prices by executive order remain in limbo. One directive that should have taken 15 days has dragged on for eight months. Regulations shelved since 2012 were briefly revived but now seem to have been buried once again, with bureaucrats of the interim government following in their predecessors' footsteps.
CAB energy adviser Professor Dr Shamsul Alam said that such executive overreach is inappropriate.
“Authority must be transparent. Boards should comprise qualified and relevant individuals—not bureaucrats. Forming boards with bureaucrats is sheer folly,” he said.
He further asserted that, by law, the power to set all energy prices lies with the BERC, yet the ministry continues to set fuel prices unlawfully, sidestepping its advisory role.
“We are preparing to take this matter to court.”
